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PAY ATTENTION TO THAT GREEN
CURTAIN:
ANONYMITY AND THE COURTS
Openness is a hallmark of the American judicial system.' The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the historical prac-
tice of presumptively open trials and the structural value of public
access to the courtroom give the public a right to attend trials and
to know what goes on in their courts. 2 This right is based upon the
public's First Amendment "right of access to information about the
conduct of public affairs,"3 a criminal defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a "public trial," and the general "principle that justice
cannot survive behind walls of silence[, which] has long been re-
flected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials."'
4
There are, however, limits to the openness of courts, and a
judge may, "in the interest of the fair administration of justice, im-
pose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.",5 Examples of such
limits include empanelling an anonymous jury and allowing parties
to file suits anonymously. However, such measures are drastic
and disfavored exceptions to the presumption of openness in judi-
cial proceedings.
Although these measures are uncommon, they have made re-
cent gains in prominence. Within the past twenty years there has
been an unprecedented willingness to alter the historical openness
of trials in order to uphold the privacy interests of jurors and par-
See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-75 (1980)
(discussing the presumption of openness inherent throughout the Anglo-American system of
justice).
2 See id. at 573 n.9 (collecting cases).
3 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)) ("'[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the
press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw."').
4 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
268 (1948)). This distrust for secret trials has played a prominent role in recent events as pun-
dits and critics express objections to plans to try alleged terrorists in secret military trials. See,
e.g., William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31 (deriding
the President's seizure of "dictatorial power to jail or execute aliens ... [in] military kangaroo
courts").
5 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.
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ties. Anonymity and anonymous speech have taken on a life of
their own. Compare, for instance, the plurality opinion in Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia,6 a 1980 case which held that the
public has a right to attend criminal trials, with the Court's opinion
in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,7 a landmark 1995 case
that dealt with the distribution of anonymous campaign literature
and established the Court's anonymous speech doctrine. 8 In Rich-
mond Newspapers, the Court stated that criminal trials have long
been presumptively open and that this openness is "no quirk of
history" but "an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American
trial." 9 Fifteen years later the Court gave unprecedented protection
for anonymity' ° and declared: "Anonymity is a shield from the tyr-
anny of the majority."'"
In some regards, this protection for anonymity and anony-
mous speech should be welcomed. However, courts have seemed
both too eager, and too reluctant, to welcome anonymity. The un-
precedented attention given to anonymous speech has created a
situation where the boundaries of anonymity in the courts are far
from clear. For instance, some courts have read provisions for al-
lowing anonymity into a rule or statute that otherwise appears
clear on its face; while other courts have refused to broaden a rule
or statute to allow for anonymity.12 Also, while various commen-
tators have looked at the issues surrounding the use of anonymous
juries or the practice of allowing a litigant to bring a claim anony-
mously, such commentators have generally focused on a single
facet of anonymity, without looking at the broader issue of ano-
nymity and the courts.
In light of these unclear boundaries, this Note attempts to
provide an analytical framework for understanding anonymity in
the courts and proposes a single test for determining when ano-
nymity - specifically, when an anonymous jury should be empan-
elled and when a party should be allowed to bring a suit anony-
mously - should be allowed to coexist with the inherent openness
of our court system. Part I of this Note discusses anonymous ju-
ries and the recent Ohio Supreme Court decision in State v. Hill,3
6 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
7 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
8 See infra notes 103-21 and accompanying text.
9 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added).
10 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
II Id. at 357.
12 Compare, e.g., State v. Samonte, 928 P.2d 1, 17 (Haw. 1996) (upholding the trial
court's "mere 'directory' construction of the word 'shall'), with, e.g., Roe v. New York, 49
F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (insisting upon a literal reading of Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)).
13 749 N.E.2d 274 (Ohio 2001).
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which upheld a local rule that made juror anonymity standard prac-
tice rather than an exceptional device for sensitive cases. Part II of
this Note discusses anonymous parties, and, in particular, anony-
mous plaintiffs in civil suits.
I. ANONYMOUS JURIES
The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
a public trial by an impartial jury. 14  Nevertheless, various state
and federal courts have empanelled an anonymous jury15 in situa-
tions where the jury is believed to need protection.' 6 The use of an
anonymous jury conceals one of the most important facets of a
criminal trial, the public role of the jury.' 7 Furthermore, the use of
an anonymous jury can affect the impartiality of a jury. Thus, the
use of an anonymous jury, which courts have held to be constitu-
tionally permissible,' 8 creates a tension between the interests of the
jury and the interests of both the defendant and the public.'
9
14 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a... public trial, by an impartial jury.").
I An anonymous jury, which can vary in degree of anonymity, is one "in which specific
identifying information about the jurors - names, addresses, employer information, or other
information - [is] not disclosed to or permitted to be revealed by the accused at trial." William
D. Bremer, Annotation, Propriety of Using Anonymous Juries in State Criminal Cases, 60
A.L.R. 5TH 39, 45 (1998); see, e.g., United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1089 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (upholding concealment of jurors' names and addresses); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d
1507, 1519 (11 th Cir. 1994) (upholding concealment of jurors' and spouses' names, addresses,
and places of employment). Anonymity may continue post-verdict. See United States v.
Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 918-22 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that without the continuation of ano-
nymity, jurors might be vulnerable to abuse after the trial ends). As an additional protective
measure, anonymous jurors often do not commute directly to and from the courthouse; instead
they are transported by the United States marshals between the courthouse and an undisclosed
central location. See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d Cir. 1991).
Finally, the Los Angeles Superior Court has adopted an intermediate form of jury anonymity for
criminal trials in which jurors' names and addresses are concealed, even after a verdict, but the
names are available to the court and counsel. See People v. Goodwin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576,
579-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("The names of the jurors were not recorded in the reporter's tran-
script, but the names were nonetheless available to the court and counsel. Since the jurors'
names were known to the court and counsel, the jurors were not anonymous.").
16 See, e.g., Ross, 33 F.3d at 1507; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (2000) (allowing a
federal district court to keep jurors' names confidential from the public "in any case where the
interests of justice so require"); 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2000) (requiring disclosure of names and
addresses of prospective jurors in capital cases at least three days before trial, unless the "court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that providing the list may jeopardize the life or safety
of any person").
17 The extent to which a jury's role should be made public is fueling the current contro-
versy regarding whether the PBS program Frontline should be allowed to film the trial and jury
deliberations of a capital murder case in Houston, Texas. See generally, e.g., Kris Axtman,
Cameras in the Jury Room Fuel Capital Debate, CHRISTIAN SCt. MONITOR, Jan. 21, 2003, at 2
(discussing whether cameras would serve the public interest by educating the public as to how a
jury decides a death-penalty case and by allowing the public to decide if the system is working).
Is See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that the
merits of anonymous juries can be worthy enough to overrule any concern regarding impinge-
ment on the defendant's constitutional rights). See generally Edmond, 730 F. Supp. at 1144-51
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When an anonymous jury is empanelled, the public is de-
prived of information that historically has been Within its purview.
Thus, an anonymous jury is at odds with the public's First
Amendment right to know about events that transpire in the court-
room and with the defendant's constitutional right to an open
trial. Moreover, the use of an anonymous jury suggests a need to
protect the jury from the defendant, and thus subverts the defen-
dant's constitutional right to a presumption of innocence. 21 This
presumption of openness in judicial proceedings is a strong pre-
sumption predicated on the text of the Constitution, 22 upon the his-
tory of our judicial system,23 and the structure of our government 24
Thus, the empanelment of an anonymous jury is by all means a
"drastic measure."
25
A. The Constitutionally Embedded Presumption of Openness in
Judicial Proceedings
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
use of anonymous juries, it has dealt with the inherent openness of
trials, and the conflict between an open trial and a desire to protect
jury privacy. For instance, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court (Press-Enterprise i),26 a newspaper successfully challenged
a trial court ruling that closed all but three days of a six-week voir
dire proceeding. 27  The Court held that the presumption of open-
ness entitles the media to be present during voir dire and that this
"presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding
(discussing how a court must balance the interests of the criminal justice system with that of the
defendant's when deciding to empanel an anonymous jury).19 See generally Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan 1. Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In
Exigent Circumstances Only, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 457, 465-84 (1999) ("[T]he
case against juror anonymity is compelling and implicates the highest values and traditions of
the American justice system.").
20 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (stating that a trial is a "public event,"
and what "transpires in the courtroom is public property").
21 See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elemen-
tary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."). See
generally Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 19, at 468-72.
22 U.S. CONST. amends. I, VI.
23 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) ("[T]hroughout its evolu-
tion, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe.").
24 See Maryland v. Bait. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari) ("One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public
should know what goes on in the courts ... [so] that the public may judge whether our system
of criminal justice is fair and right."); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir.
2002) ("Democracies die behind closed doors.").
2 United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (1 th Cir. 1994).
26 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
27 Id. at 503.
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interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 28
While the Court indicated that a concern for jury privacy may, in
some circumstances, warrant keeping portions of the voir dire pro-
ceeding out of the public domain,29 it held that a blanket closure,
which failed to consider less restrictive alternatives, was constitu-
tionally impermissible.
30
Although the holding in Press-Enterprise I was based on First
Amendment principles, later that year, in Waller v. Georgia,31 the
Court recognized that a closed trial also conflicts with the right of
the defendant:
[T]here can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment
right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than
the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.
The central aim of a criminal proceeding must be to try the
accused fairly, and "[o]ur cases have uniformly recognized
the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the
defendant.,
32
As a default, a fair trial is an open trial; however, in some
situations, the defendant's principal right to a fair trial may war-
rant closure: "[T]he Court has made clear that the right to an open
trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such
as the defendant's right to a fair trial. 33 Therefore, under certain
circumstances a trial court has been allowed to close portions of a
trial to the public by empanelling an anonymous jury - a procedure
designed to take into account the fact that the public's rights are
25 Id. at 510.
29 Id. at 512. This view was not shared by all the justices. See id. at 513-15 (Blackmun,
J., concurring) ("I write separately to emphasize my understanding that the Court does not de-
cide, nor does this case require it to address, the asserted 'right to privacy of the prospective
jurors' . . . . I am concerned that recognition of a juror's privacy 'right' would unnecessarily
complicate the lives of trial judges .... "). But see Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765
(1929) (discussing a juror's expectation of basic privacy necessary to exercise calm and in-
formed judgment). See generally Michael R. Glover, Comment, The Right to Privacy of Pro-
spective Jurors During Voir Dire, 70 CAL. L. REV. 708 (1982) (discussing the conflicting inter-
ests between the parties' right to an impartial jury and the prospective jurors' fight to privacy).
30 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984).
For instance, the Court suggested that the trial judge could have released a transcript of the voir
dire, sealing only "[tihose parts of the transcript reasonably entitled to privacy." Id. at 513; see
also State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180, 188 (Ohio 2002) (hold-
ing juror questionnaires to be part of the voir dire process, and thus presumptively open to the
public).
31 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
32 Id. at 46 (emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (quoting Gannett Co. v. De-
Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)).
33 Id. at 45; see also Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 508 ("No right ranks higher than the
right of the accused to a fair trial.").
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secondary to the defendant's rights.34 For example, in Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I/),35 a case
dealing with the release of a preliminary hearing transcript, the
Court held that the hearing could be closed to the public if "spe-
cific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is a substan-
tial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second,
reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the
defendant's fair trial rights. 36
Given the defendant's principal right to a fair trial, courts em-
panelling an anonymous jury will state that they are using the dras-
tic measure while still preserving the defendant's right to a fair
trial.37 However, in practice an anonymous jury is empanelled pri-
marily for the benefit of the jurors. 38 Anonymous juries often have
been empanelled against defendants' wishes, and the use of
anonymous juries often serves as grounds for appeal. 39 As a result
of such, the use of an anonymous jury has the unusual effect of
making the jurors' rights superior to those of both the defendant
and the public. Therefore, the empanelling of an anonymous jury
is properly viewed with skepticism.4 °
B. The Use of Anonymous Juries
From a defendant's point of view, the use of an anonymous
jury undercuts the presumption of innocence and the right to ex-
34 In other words, although both the defendant and the public derive benefits from the
Sixth Amendment guarantee to open trial, Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383; cf. Globe Newspaper v.
Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1982), the defendant's right is primary. See generally
Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501.
35 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
36 Id. at 14. In formulating this test the Court explicitly rejected the "reasonable likeli-
hood" test, which was used by the California Supreme Court, in favor of the "substantial prob-
ability" test. Id.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that jury
anonymity "promotes impartial decision making").
38 For instance, in United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), an early anony-
mous jury case that involved, inter alia, the conviction of eleven defendants in a narcotics con-
spiracy case, the Second Circuit upheld the use of an anonymous jury, finding that "[jury] ano-
nymity and sequestration comported with [the trial court's] obligation to protect the jury, to
assure its privacy, and to avoid all possible mental blocks against impartiality." Id. at 141.
39 See, e.g., United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1998); Scarfo, 850 F.2d at
1023 (noting defendant's dissatisfaction with the use of an anonymous jury).
40 United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1522 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Work v. State, 2
Ohio St. 296, 303 (1853) (explaining that the institution of trial by jury "demands our jealous
scrutiny when innovations are attempted to be made upon it").
41 See Ross, 33 F.3d at 1519 ("An anonymous jury raises the specter that the defendant is
a dangerous person from whom the jurors must be protected, thereby implicating the defen-
dant's constitutional right to a presumption of innocence."). See generally Commonwealth v.
Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 170-72 (Mass. 1993) (reversing conviction by anonymous jury when
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ercise peremptory challenges 42 - concerns that also affect the in-
tegrity of the judicial process. Nevertheless, this exceptional pro-
cedure has been held permissible when a trial court (1) concludes
"that there is strong reason to believe the jury needs protection,"
and (2) takes "reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial
effects on the defendant and to ensure that his fundamental rights
are protected.,
43
Several factors have justified the conclusion that a jury needs
protection:
(1) the defendants' involvement in organized crime; (2) the
defendants' participation in a group with the capacity to harm
jurors; (3) the defendants' past attempts to interfere with the
judicial process or witnesses; (4) the potential that, if con-
victed, the defendants will suffer a lengthy incarceration and
substantial monetary penalties; and, (5) extensive publicity
that could enhance the possibility that jurors' names would
become public and expose them to intimidation and harass-
ment."
Once a court determines that a jury needs protection, the court
must minimize the prejudicial effects of an anonymous jury on the
defendant's rights by allowing the parties to conduct an adequate
voir dire, and by instructing the jury that their need for anonymity
is not attributable to the defendant's guilt or character:
Where jury anonymity is warranted, we have found the de-
fendant's fundamental right to an unbiased jury is adequately
protected by the court's conduct of "'a voir dire designed to
uncover bias as to issues in the cases and as to the defendant
himself."' In addition, we have found the danger that the jury
trial court failed to properly consider impact anonymous jury would have on defendant's consti-
tutionally protected presumption of innocence).
42 See Scaifo, 850 F.2d at 1021-26. The use of an anonymous jury limits the amount of
information obtained in voir dire and this might prevent a defendant from uncovering a hidden
bias of a juror. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 19, at 476-79 (stating that "juror ano-
nymity prevents a defendant from learning whether '[a] juror might turn out to be related to a
party or a witness (yet not disclose this on voir dire) or to live in a neighborhood whose resi-
dents have demographic characteristics predictive of their likely response to the issues in the
case').
43 United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991). Generally, an anony-
mous jury is not permitted in capital cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2000) (requiring disclosure
of names and addresses of prospective jurors in capital cases at least three days before trial,
unless "the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that providing the list may jeopardize
the life or safety of any person.").
14 United States v. Salvatore, 110 F.3d 1131, 1143 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States
v. Koubriti, No. 01-CR-80778, 2003 WL 1456233, at *3-6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2003) (discuss-
ing the use of an anonymous jury in September 11-related terrorist trial that, inter alia, has gen-
erated a great deal of media attention).
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might infer that the need for additional security was attribut-
able to the character of the defendant was minimized where
the court took care to give the jurors a plausible and nonpre-judicial reason for not disclosing their identities or for taking
other security measures.45
Thus, courts have held, "when genuinely needed and when
property used, anonymous juries do not infringe a defendant's con-
stitutional rights. 46 Nevertheless, despite the fact that courts have
traditionally circumscribed the use of anonymous juries, their use
is on the rise.47
1. Making the Unusual Routine: State v. Hill
On September 15, 1997, Harry Sisco was standing outside his
home in Lancaster, Ohio when he was killed in a drive-by shoot-
ing. Ten days later, Clifton Hill, Mr. Sisco's stepson, was indicted
for the murder.48
In a practice unique to Fairfield County, Hill, like all criminal
defendants in the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court, was tried
in front of an anonymous jury.49  Hill appealed his conviction,
claiming inter alia, that the "trial court erred when it empanelled
an anonymous jury in the absence of any evidence or findings that
an anonymous jury was necessary in this case." Hill alleged that
his right to a presumption of innocence and to a trial by a fair and
impartial jury had been violated.5 °
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that
the trial court's use of an anonymous jury, in the absence of "any
particularized need" for one, "necessitates a new trial., 51 This de-
cision, however, was reversed, 6-1, by the Ohio Supreme Court in
State v. Hill.52 In reversing, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a lo-
45 Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192 (citations omitted). The court suggested "protection against
pressures from media" as a plausible reason for anonymity. Id. (citing United States v. Thomas,
757 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985)). But see Scarfo, 850 F.2d
at 1023-28 (upholding trial judge's instructions to the jury, which was hearing a criminal case
against an alleged "boss" of an organized crime family, that they would remain anonymous in
order to prevent any apprehensions about their safety or the safety of their families).
46 Ross, 33 F.3d at 1519 (emphasis added).
47 See Adam Liptak, Nameless Juries Are on the Rise in Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
18, 2002, at Al.
48 State v. Hill, 749 N.E.2d 274, 276-77 (Ohio 2001).
49 State v. Hill, 737 N.E.2d 577, 581 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
50 Id. at 579.
52 7d. at 583.52 749 N.E.2d 274.
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cal rule that made juror anonymity standard practice rather than an
exceptional device for sensitive cases.
53
The local rule at issue, which has been in effect since May
1996, provides that the names and addresses of all jurors will re-
main anonymous, absent a showing of good cause.54 The rule
states that it was implemented in order to "maintain secrecy of the
grand jury proceedings and the privacy of petit jurors, to alleviate
the concern of the jurors for fear of intimidation and/or harass-
ment, to encourage jurors' willingness to participate as jurors, and
to fulfill the Court's promise of confidentiality.,
55
However, this rule fundamentally changes the nature of an
anonymous jury from an extraordinary procedure designed to en-
sure juror safety, to a routine procedure designed to protect juror
privacy to an unprecedented degree. The unanimous three-judge
appellate court recognized this fact: "The anonymous jury system
[in Fairfield County] is a significant alteration to the way jury tri-
als have been conducted in this state. 56 The court postulated that
the "carte blanche anonymous jury" system may be the result of a
laudable concern - the trial court's "concern for accommodating
jurors who may be hesitant or timid about jury service" - but that
the anonymous jury system "nonetheless flies in the face of his-
tory, precedent, custom and the federal cases." 57
The Ohio Supreme Court based its reversal on Hill's "failure
to raise the anonymity issue at trial., 58 This allowed the court to
avoid, at least for now, the larger issue of the validity of a "carte
blanche anonymous jury" rule.59 Justice Paul E. Pfeifer dissented
and argued that the carte blanche rule should be abandoned be-
cause anonymous juries "affect 'the entire conduct of the trial from
beginning to end' and 'the framework within which the trial pro-
ceeds.'"60
53 Id. at 283 (stating that a "thorough review of the record reveals no hints of any preju-
dice to appelle flowing from the use of an anonymous jury").
5 Id. at 278.
55 Id.
56 Hill, 737 N.E.2d at 582.
57 Id. at 582-83.
58 Hill, 749 N.E.2d at 281.
59 While the Ohio Supreme Court was able to avoid the issue, a similar issue is currently
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which has been asked to decide whether anonymous
juries can be empanelled as a matter of routine or standard trial court practice. See State v.
Tucker, No. 00-3354-CR, 2001 WL 1590738 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec 12, 2001), cert. granted, 643
N.W.2d 97 (Wis. 2002).
60 Hill, 749 N.E.2d at 289 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). In arguing against the routine use of
anonymous juries, Justice Pfeifer noted that there has been no tradition of anonymous juries in
Ohio, and that changes or "innovations" to a bedrock institution, such as trial by jury, demand
careful scrutiny. Id. at 288.
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2. The Case Against the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries
In order to justify the drastic measure of making anonymous
juries a routine practice, the Fairfield County court gave conflict-
ing reasons, not mentioned by either state court, for the rule. Fair-
field County Judge Joseph Clark, the leading proponent of and
driving force behind the local rule, told the Wall Street Journal
that the rule was initiated by his haunting memories "of a dis-
traught prospective juror who was forced to reveal during pretrial
question that she had been raped by her stepfather. '' 61 Judge Clark,
however, told the Cleveland Plain Dealer that the rule was "insti-
tuted without public discussion after some jurors said they were
being followed to their cars during the trial of an anti-government
zealot.
' 62
Neither reason, however, justifies a blanket rule. The reason
given to the Wall Street Journal is not convincing because an
anonymous juror does not have any unique rights that would allow
her, but not a non-anonymous juror, to abstain from answering
questions during voir dire.63  Likewise, the reason given to the
Plain Dealer is not convincing because potential jury-tampering
problems in a single case against an anti-government "zealot" do
not justify a blanket rule - especially when less drastic protective
measures are available.
64
Commentators have offered other reasons for the routine use
of anonymous juries. Professor Nancy King, a leading proponent
of juror anonymity, has suggested four advantages to a blanket
61 Jerry Markon, Judges Pushing for More Privacy of Jurors' Names, WALL ST. J., June
27, 2001, at BI:
To protect the privacy of jurors in Fairfield County, Ohio, state court
Judge Joseph Clark decided a few years ago to keep their names anony-
mous. He had been haunted by the memory of a distraught prospective
juror who was forced to reveal during pretrial questioning that she had
been raped by her stepfather. She said she had never told anyone, not
even her husband. "I get tears in my eyes even now thinking about it,"
says Judge Clark .... Jurors, he adds "love" the idea.
62 T.C. Brown, Juror Identities Hidden Illegally, Convict Argues, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), Feb. 1, 2001, at B4 (emphasis added).
63 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 512
(1984) (Jurors "believing public questioning will prove damaging because of embarrassment,
may properly request an opportunity to present the problem to the judge in camera."). Juror
privacy issues are discussed at length in Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 357-60 (E.D.
Tex. 1995), in which the court held that a potential juror is entitled to refuse to answer questions
during voir dire. The court also describes how the in camera procedure should be implemented
to allow "the public the maximum exposure to the proceedings without the disclosure of private
matters which would interfere with the juror's ability to serve." Id. at 360.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36 (noting that a hearing may be closed to the
public); supra note 15 (discussing how jurors need not commute directly to and from the court-
house).
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rule: (1) more reliable voir dire; (2) improved jury deliberations;
(3) prevention of jury intimidation; and (4) greater jury participa-
tion.65
These advantages, however, are illusory and fail to provide a
compelling reason for altering the structural process within which
a criminal trial proceeds. In fact, Professor King provides the
bases for arguing against the routine use of anonymous jurors her-
self. She suggests that anonymity will enhance the voir dire proc-
ess by allowing jurors to avoid public embarrassment, but she also
acknowledges that anonymous juries are "feasible" only in urban
areas.66  First, jurors already have the means to avoid public em-
barrassment via the in camera procedure described by the Court in
Press-Enterprise 167 Second, this urban-areas-only limitation
would mean that a defendant accused of theft in one part of the
state would face a drastically different criminal trial process than
would a similar defendant in another part of the state.
The other three advantages offered by Professor King are
based on the notion that anonymity allays juror fears. History,
however, has demonstrated that such fears are largely unfounded
and thus are not in need of remedying. This too is something Pro-
fessor King acknowledges: "[Jiuror nightmares do not often come
true" and fears of juror harassment "outstrip reality. 68 Moreover,
there is nothing to suggest juror apprehension is a new problem
that requires drastic new remedies. 69 This is not to say that jurors
may never have legitimate fears, based upon facts, that require a
remedy; such fears would naturally demand a trial court's attention
and remedy. 70  However, isolated and anecdotal incidents do not
warrant a blanket rule, and do not rise to the level of Press-
Enterprise H's "substantial probability" test 7' necessary to over-
65 Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in
Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 136-39 (1996).
66 Id. at 125 & n.7 ("Anonymous juries may be impractical in small communities where a
glimpse of a face or a few tidbits of employment information or life history would allow com-
munity members to zero in on a name.").
67 See cases cited supra note 63; see also State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Bond,
781 N.E.2d 180, 189-90 (Ohio 2002) ("Consistent with Press-Enterprise 1, trial judges should
inform prospective jurors of their right to request an in-camera hearing, on the record and with
counsel present, regarding any written question during the voir dire process.").
0 King, supra note 65, at 127; see also Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 19, at 466-
68 (discussing the lack of necessity for juror anonymity in light of the few instances in which
jurors have been injured, and the absence of a juror being killed, as a result of service on a jury).
69 King, supra note 65, at 127 n.20.
70 See United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 1964) (discussing threat felt by
some jurors after seven jurors received unsigned letters telling them to find defendants guilty);
Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Tex. 1995) ("While the parties have attorneys
to champion their rights, the court must protect the privacy rights of the prospective jurors.").
71 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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come the constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in
judicial proceedings.
Finally, a frequent argument for the routine use of anonymous
juries is that anonymity would no longer suggest guilt:
As long as jurors believe that withholding their names is an
extraordinary practice, anonymity will suggest to them that
the judge considers the defendant to be a particularly danger-
ous person who may retaliate if convicted .... Granting juror
anonymity routinely, rather than upon proof of a real risk to
juror safety, would remove the stigma of guilt that selective
anonymity carries.72
This might be a benefit in a specific trial, but this argument over-
looks the impact of anonymity on the overall judicial process -
i.e., even though jury anonymity may not suggest that any one de-
fendant is more guilty than another, it would suggest that defen-
dants as a whole are, generally speaking, guilty of the crimes
charged and that jurors need protection.73 This, of course, would
violate a defendant's constitutional right to a presumption of inno-
cence.
74
C. Proposed Test for Anonymous Juries
Anonymous juries have their place. However, like any form
of anonymity in the court, an anonymous jury should be empan-
elled only after careful consideration. When considering the use of
an anonymous jury, a court should not empanel one unless: (1) the
use of an anonymous jury has something to do with the content of
the trial or litigation; or (2) the absence of an anonymous jury sig-
nificantly burdens the trial process in some way. This test is con-
sistent with the test currently used by a majority of courts, which
looks to see whether there is a strong reason to believe the jury
needs protection. 75 Of course, once a determination to empanel an
anonymous jury is made, a court must take precautions to mini-
mize the prejudicial effects.
72 King, supra note 65, at 145-46.
73 See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 19, at 472 (noting that routine anonymity
would categorize all criminal defendants as menacing persons from whom jurors need to be
protected).
74 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
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D. Applying the Proposed Test for Anonymous Juries
Under the proposed test the use of an anonymous jury would
be proper, for example, in a trial involving a member of a known
organized crime family or an organization known for violence; of
course, the mere "invocation of the words 'organized crime,'
'mob,' or 'mafia,' [without] something more, does not warrant an
anonymous jury. ' '76  The use of an anonymous jury is proper
where articulable facts show that the content of the trial or litiga-
tion is such that a reasonable juror may fear intimidation. Two
Second Circuit cases, United States v. Real Property Known as 77
East 3rd Street77 and United States v. Barnes,78 illustrate such
situations.
77 East 3rd Street was a civil forfeiture action against a build-
ing owned by the New York City Chapter of the Hells Angels Mo-
torcycle Club, that allegedly was used to store and distribute nar-
cotics. The court empanelled an anonymous jury after noting that
the "history of violence perpetrated by members and associates of
the Church of Angels demonstrates that they 'possess the means to
harm the jurors."' 79 Specifically, the trial court noted: at the time
of arrest numerous weapons, including rifles, handguns, and an uzi
machine gun, were recovered; many members of the Hells Angels
Club had been implicated in violence against, and intimidation of,
witnesses in earlier criminal prosecutions; threats of violence and
intimidation of witnesses occurred during the criminal prosecution
of members who were arrested with the individual claimants in the
case; jurors in some of the criminal prosecutions of Club members
were followed to the cars; a Club member approached one juror's
child to convey a threat; and, the presence of large numbers of
Club members at Club trials intimidated other jurors.8° 77 East
3rd Street illustrates how articulable facts can demonstrate that a
reasonable juror may feel intimidated, and how such intimation
may significantly burden the trial process by affecting a juror's
ability to deliberate and reach an impartial decision.
Barnes was a trial against Leroy "Nicky" Barnes, the notori-
ous head of a Harlem narcotics network, and fourteen co-
defendants. The seriousness of the alleged offenses, combined
with the events that occurred before trial, warranted the use of an
anonymous jury. For instance, the court was aware of a threat
76 United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1991).
77 849 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
78 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
79 77 East 3rd Street, 849 F. Supp. at 879.
80 Id. at 878.
20031 1021
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
against a government witness who was in protective custody,
which allegedly threatened, "If he does anything, he'll be dead." 8'
Also, "on the eve of trial" another potential witness was murdered
at "the site of much of the trafficking in [the Barnes] case."
82
Likewise, Barnes demonstrates, via articulable facts, how the con-
tent of a trial can be central to the use of an anonymous jury and
how the trial process itself can be burdened by the absence of ano-
nymity.
Finally, under the proposed test, the use of an anonymous jury
would be proper in a trial against a defendant whose previous trial
ended in a mistrial due to jury tampering. This specific type of a
significant burden on the trial process was addressed by the Ha-
waii Supreme Court in State v. Samonte,83 where the Hawaii Su-
preme Court upheld the use of an anonymous jury in the defen-
dant's third trial.84 The use of an anonymous jury was warranted
in Samonte because the absence of an anonymous jury would have
significantly burdened the trial process by increasing the likeli-
hood of a mistrial. Likewise, if the jury has a legitimate fear of
harassment by the media, then an anonymous jury should be em-
panelled, in order to minimize burdens on the trial process.
85
Anonymous juries should be used in situations like 77 East
3rd Street and Barnes, where the content of the trial is such that
there is a strong reason to believe the jury needs protection; like-
wise, the use of an anonymous jury is appropriate in situations
such as Samonte, where the trial process itself is threatened. How-
ever, in the vast majority of cases there is neither a substantial
likelihood of harm to the jury or to the judicial process, nor any
compelling rationale to overcome the constitutionally embedded
presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.
II. PARTY ANONYMITY
Many, but not all, of the arguments against anonymity and the
use of anonymous juries in criminal trials are applicable to civil
81 Barnes, 604 F.2d at 136.
82 Id. at 137 n.7.
83 928 P.2d I (Haw. 1996).
84 Id. at 17.
85 Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 342 (1966) ("All three Cleveland news-
papers published the names and addresses of the veniremen. As a consequence, anonymous
letters and telephone calls, as well as calls from friends, regarding the impending prosecution
were received by all of the prospective jurors."), with Order Denying Motion to Empanel an
Anonymous Jury at 2, United States v. Traficant (N.D. Ohio) (No. 4:01 CR 207), available at
http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/Clerk-sOffice/NotableCases/0lcr2O7doc131.pdf ("Despite the
fact that this case has attracted some pretrial publicity, members of the press have conducted
themselves responsibly and with respect for the integrity of the Court proceedings.").
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trials. However, as a result of the different interests at stake in
civil trials,86 many of the arguments against anonymity carry less
weight when applied to litigants in civil trials. In criminal trials
anonymity must be balanced against the defendant's constitution-
ally protected interests, which often weigh against anonymity. By
contrast, in civil trials anonymity should be considered alongside
the plaintiff's potential privacy concerns and the protection given
to anonymous speech - protection intended to act as "a shield from
the tyranny of the majority. 87 The protection given to anonymous
speech, in conjunction with a plaintiff's privacy concerns, allows
litigants in certain situations to bring suits anonymously and thus
to keep their identities away from the public. 88 Nevertheless, party
anonymity remains an unsettled area of law, as there is a growing
tension between the inherent openness of the courts and the in-
creased protection for anonymous speech.
The Supreme Court has given tacit approval to the practice of
bringing suits anonymously, 89 and "it is clear that a practice has
developed permitting individuals to sue under fictitious names
where the issues involved are matters of a sensitive and highly per-
sonal nature." 90 Nevertheless there is no formal recognition - ei-
ther through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or through Su-
preme Court jurisprudence - of this practice. In fact, the Federal
Rules actually suggest that the practice is disallowed91 and calls for
formal recognition of the practice have gone unanswered; 92 as a
86 See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 493 (1972) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas
& Marshall, J.J., dissenting) ("We permit proof by a preponderance of the evidence in civil
litigation because 'we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict
in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor. We do
not take that view in criminal cases.").
87 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
88 Typically party anonymity is achieved using a fictitious name, often "John Doe."
89 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90 Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974).
91 See FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a) ("Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth ... the
[full] names of all the parties"). But see FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) (authorizing court to make any
protective "order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden"). However, a few courts have held that in order for a
judge to make a ruling on a plaintiff's Rule 26(c) motion for anonymity, a plaintiff must first
file a valid complaint that satisfies Rule 10(a). See, e.g., Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that a complaint that does not identity any plaintiff in the title is inef-
fective to commence an action).
92 See Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize
John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883 (1996); Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous
Parties: When Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HAST-
INGS L.J. 1 (1985).
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result, courts lack a consistent procedure for analyzing requests for
party anonymity.93
The immediate consequence of the current situation is that
"'there is no legal right in parties either to be allowed anonymity
or to avoid it' ' 94 - despite the fact that the practice has been going
on for at least forty years in federal courts.95 This lack of consis-
tent procedural and substantive law creates judicial inefficiency.96
Party anonymity is both rare97 and disfavored. 98  As with jury
anonymity, the starting points for this presumption against party
anonymity are the First and Sixth Amendments. As discussed in
Part I, the combined force of these amendments has established a
clear public right of access to judicial proceedings that is in ten-
sion with any form of anonymity in the courts, including party
anonymity. 99 Nevertheless, the number of anonymous party law-
suits has skyrocketed: in 1963 there were only seven decisions
throughout the federal district court system that involved a "John
Doe" party bringing a civil suit; thirty years later the number had
risen to nearly 200.'°°
The large increase in the number of anonymous party cases
underscores the need for formal recognition of anonymous parties
and for consistent procedures to analyze their propriety. This Sec-
tion highlights the shortcomings of the current situation, and dis-
cusses how the proposed test for anonymity can be used to deter-
mine whether a party should be allowed to initiate a lawsuit
anonymously.
93 Compare, e.g., M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 802 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing plain-
tiff's appeals from a trial court order denying her leave to proceed under an assumed name, and
from trial court denying her leave to file an amended complaint under seal), with, e.g., James v.
Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing how plaintiffs commenced action by
obtaining an ex parte protective order permitting them to use pseudonyms, before filing their
complaint). See also Steinman, supra note 92, at 85 n.376.
94 Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 803 (quoting James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1993)).
95 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 498 n.l (1961) (noting that Paul and Pauline
Poe are fictitious names used in light of the "special circumstances" of the case - here, challeng-
ing a state prohibition on the use of contraceptives).
96 See, e.g., Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 799-801 (discussing procedural history leading to the
appeal).
97 See Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Proceeding under a
pseudonym in federal court, is by all accounts, 'an unusual procedure."').
98 See, e.g., Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997)
("The use of fictitious names is disfavored ....").
99 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) ("[T]he right of
access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial
process and the government as a whole."); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 580 (1980) (holding that the First Amendment guarantees the public's right to attend
criminal trials). See generally Steinman, supra note 92, at 3-19.
100 Rice, supra note 92, at 884 n.2.
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A. Competing Interests
Courts will often defer to the constitutionally embedded pre-
sumption of openness and disallow litigants the ability to bring
their suits anonymously. For instance, in Femedeer v. Haun,10 a
case dealing with Utah's sex offender registration and notification
statute, the Tenth Circuit denied anonymity to the fictitiously
named plaintiff due to the public's "important interest in access to
legal proceedings, particularly those attacking the constitutionality
of popularly enacted legislation.' 0 2 However, the Supreme Court
has held that a citizen's right to privacy protects her from certain
state-compelled disclosures, and thus entitles her to anonymity. 
3
Notably, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,104 the Court
struck down an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of
anonymous campaign literature.10 5  McIntyre involved a First
Amendment challenge to a $100 fine for distributing unsigned
leaflets that urged voters of Westerville, Ohio, to vote against an
upcoming school tax levy. 10 6  At the time, nearly every state, as
well as the District of Columbia, had a statute that banned anony-
mous political literature. 0 7  Nevertheless, the Court struck down
the Ohio statute, creating the anonymous speech doctrine; as Jus-
tice Thomas noted, the number of states with laws similar to
Ohio's was unimportant: "[W]hat is important is whether the
Framers in 1791 believed anonymous speech sufficiently valuable
to deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights."'0 8
McIntyre recognized that, in some situations, a right of ano-
nymity is necessary in order "to protect unpopular individuals
1t 227 F.3d 1244.
102 Id. at 1246.
103 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (hold-
ing that the First Amendment prohibits a state from compelling disclosures by a minor political
party, when such disclosures will subject those persons to threats, harassment or reprisals);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that Alabama may not compel disclosure of
the names and addresses of rank and file NAACP members, when such disclosure would
amount to a restraint on members' right to associate by subjecting them to private community
pressures).
1- 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
15 Id. at 357.
106 Id. at 337-38. The handbills "purported to express the views of 'CONCERNED PAR-
ENTS AND TAX PAYERS'; nevertheless, Mrs. McIntyre essentially acted alone. Id. at 337.
Ohio law required that all campaign literature conspicuously show "the name and residence or
business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization . . .who issues,
makes, or is responsible" for the literature. Id. at 338 n.3.
107 See id. at 376 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 370 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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from retaliation - and their ideas from suppression - at the hand of
an intolerant society."' 09
This right to speak anonymously, including against the gov-
ernment, was given greater protection four years later in Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc."0 In ACLF the
Court affirmed a Tenth Circuit decision that had invalidated a
Colorado statute prohibiting anonymous speech."' The Colorado
statute in ACLF was one that, inter alia, required ballot-initiative
petition circulators to wear badges that stated their names. 1 2  At
issue was a process by which Colorado citizens were allowed to
make laws.13 The Court held that requiring petition circulators to
wear identification badges impermissibly discouraged participation
in the political process, notwithstanding the fact that the Colorado
ballot-initiative petition process is not a right guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.' 4 Relying on McIntyre, the Court re-
affirmed the right to speak anonymously: "[T]he restraint on
speech in this case is more severe than was the restraint in McIn-
tyre .... The injury to speech is heightened for the petition circu-
lator because the badge requirement compels personal name identi-
fication at the precise moment when the circulator's interest in
anonymity is greatest."''
5
Finally, in the 2001-02 term, the Court expanded the anony-
mous speech doctrine in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of
New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton." 6 At the appellate level, the
Sixth Circuit declined to extend McIntyre and upheld the constitu-
tionally of an ordinance that required Jehovah's Witnesses and
other door-to-door canvassers, including those who may advocate
a political cause, 117 to register with the village prior to canvass-
109 Id. at 357; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Strat-
ton, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2089-90 (2002) (holding that requiring a permit as a prior condition on the
exercise of the right to speak is a "dramatic departure from our national heritage" and "imposes
an objective [and unconstitutional] burden ...."); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
(invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafleting). But see Alan M. Dershow-
itz, Why Fear National ID Cards?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at A23 (arguing that there is no
right to anonymity, notwithstanding a right to privacy - "No such right [of anonymity] is hinted
at in the Constitution. And though the Supreme Court has identified a right to privacy, privacy
and anonymity are not the same.").
110 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
I ld. at 197-200.
112 Id. at 188.
113 See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1, cls. 1-2; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 - 1-40-106
(2002). Although obvious, it should be noted that citizens can make laws through other means
as well - such as using the courts to challenge the validity of a law or statute.
114 ACLF, 525 U.S. at 191-92,200.
115 Id. at 199.
116 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002).
117 And, as stated during oral arguments, even Halloween trick-or-treaters and perhaps the
neighbor who asks to borrow a cup of sugar would be required to register first. See Watchtower
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ing. 118  Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the Court's
anonymous speech doctrine, it relied on a syllogism and held
McIntyre inapplicable:
We agree that [the right established in McIntyre] arguably in-
cludes in that right the ability to speak to others anony-
mously. But we do not understand how [the Village's] ordi-
nance inhibits this right. As we see it, individuals going
door-to-door... are not anonymous by virtue of the fact that
they reveal a portion of their identities - their physical identi-
ties - to the residents they canvass. In other words, the ordi-
nance does not require canvassers going door-to-door to re-
veal their identities; instead, the very act of going door-to-
door requires the canvassers to reveal a portion of their iden-
tities.19
The Village offered several reasons for the ordinance; specifi-
cally, prevention of fraud, protection of resident privacy, and pre-
vention of crime. The Court, however, rejected the Village's
stated interests 120 and reversed the decision of the Sixth Circuit.
121
In so doing, the Court once again upheld the right to engage in
anonymous political speech and reiterated the constitutional
importance of unrestricted public speech.
When applied to litigants who seek to redress wrongs - in-
cluding those who seek to make or change laws through the courts
- this right of anonymity, derived through McIntyre, ACLF, and
Village of Stratton, conflicts with the right of the public to have
full access to their courts.' 22  Nevertheless, the rationale used to
protect anonymous speech in ACLF was the same rationale used by
the Fifth Circuit to protect plaintiff anonymity in Doe v. Stegall.1
23
Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, No. 00-1737, 2002 U.S. TRANS. LEXIS
18, at *25-56 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2002); see also Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. at 2089.
118 240 F.3d 553, 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2001).
119 Id. at 563. Inexplicably, the Sixth Circuit did not mention ACLF; this did not go unno-
ticed by the Court. See Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. at 2090 ("The Sixth Circuit's reasoning is
undetermined by our decision in ACLF .... The fact that circulators revealed their physical
identities did not foreclose our consideration of the circulators' interest in maintaining their
anonymity.").
120 Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. at 2089-91; see also id. at 2091-92 (Breyer, J., joined by
Souter & Ginsburg, J.J., concurring) (writing separately to note that the "crime prevention'
justification for this ordinance is not a strong one"). As mentioned by the Court, id. at 2085,
there was reason to believe that the ordinance was the result of the Village's hostility towards
Jehovah's Witnesses. See generally, e.g., David G. Savage, Justices Take Door-to-Door
Preaching Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at A16 (briefly discussing an earlier version of the
ordinance that had specifically targeted Jehovah's Witnesses).
121 Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. at 2091.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 26-36.
123 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981).
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In Stegall an anonymous parent brought a suit, on behalf of her
minor children, challenging their middle school's program of "re-
ligiously-oriented ceremonies broadcast each morning over the
public address system."' 24  The Fifth Circuit ruled that the plain-
tiffs should be allowed to sue anonymously in order to protect
against "possible threatened harm and serious social ostracization
based upon militant religious attitudes."'' 25  The court acknowl-
edged that public access to court proceedings is "more than a cus-
tomary procedural formality,"' 1 6 but found "precedent for depart-
ing from a procedural custom fraught with constitutional overtones
to accommodate a plaintiff's asserted need to proceed anony-
mously.'
127
This tension in Stegall is representative of the need, on one
hand, to protect anonymous speech, and the need, on the other
hand, to preserve the openness of courts. 28
B. Current Tests
Without any provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
or any Supreme Court holding as guidance, courts have adopted
vastly different approaches when forced to determine whether a
plaintiff should be allowed to initiate or maintain a lawsuit using a
124 Id. at 182:
Plaintiffs allege that the school faculty and administrators randomly se-
lect students to read poetry, Bible verses, and prayers of a Protestant cast
for the school's daily morning devotional observance. The chosen stu-
dents are expected to rehearse their devotionals before a classroom of
their peers and then to perform over the school-wide public address sys-
tem. Verbal pressure is allegedly exerted on students who do not par-
ticipate willingly.
125 Id. at 186.
126 Id. at 185.
127 Id.
128 Openness is not the only issue in tension with anonymous plaintiffs. In some instances,
a court will address a litigant's right of anonymity in connection with: (1) res judicata and
collateral estoppel, see, e.g., Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting
that "without Appellee's identity in the public record, it is difficult to apply legal principles of
res judicata and collateral estoppel"); (2) plaintiffs standing and the validity of plaintiff's claim,
see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973) ("Despite the use of the pseudonym, no sug-
gestion is made that Roe is a fictitious person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true, and
as established, her existence; her pregnant state, as of the inception of her suit in March 1970..
. and her inability to obtain a legal abortion in Texas."); and (3) the negative effect a lawsuit has
on the defendant, who is not protected by anonymity, see, e.g., Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for
Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 690 (1 lth Cir. 2001) (Hill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)("[The defendants] have had their professional reputations impugned by the mere filing of [the
plaintiff's] lawsuit. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why they will be any
less embarrassed by these proceedings than she. We have said before that such circumstances
do not favor anonymity .. "), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002).
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fictitious name. 129 This is an undesirable situation 130 that has led to
undesirable results - ranging from an indiscriminate ban on ano-
nymity 31 to a wholesale endorsement of anonymity. A review
of anonymous party cases indicates that courts have based their
decisions to grant or deny party anonymity using one (or more) of
four distinct tests. These four tests can be characterized as: (1) a
blanket prohibition; (2) a balancing test; (3) a content-based test;
and (4) a factor-based test.
1. Blanket Prohibition
A small number of courts have held that a complaint filed by
an anonymous party fails to commence a proper lawsuit and there-
fore must be dismissed - either upon motion or sua sponte. For
instance, in Roe v. New York, 33 a group of unnamed minors at-
tempted to bring a Section 1983 claim against the state for its al-
legedly inadequate care and treatment of individuals within the
state training school system.' 34 The court, however, dismissed the
complaint, holding that "if a complaint does not identify any plain-
tiff in the title or otherwise, then its filing is ineffective to com-
mence an action." 135 The decision rested solely upon a literal read-
ing of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), 136 and not upon con-
siderations of a litigant's right of anonymity or the inherent open-
129 See supra note 93; Steinman, supra note 92, at 2 (lamenting that federal and state
"courts have not yet refined an analysis for determining when litigants may sue or be sued pseu-
donymously").
130 Steinman, supra note 92, at 2 ("[T]he current ad hoc procedures for handing pseudo-
nymity are unsatisfactory.").
131 See, e.g., James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 240 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[lt seems obvious that
the amended order [by the trial judge] simply reflected ... [a] personal unwillingness to allow
anonymity at trial .... [The record indicates] that the [trial court] ruling here was based more
on a judicially-adopted general rule than on a true exercise of case-specific discretion.").
132 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (citations omitted):
We are similarly distressed by the district judge's decision to allow the
Doe Companies to proceed anonymously. We are not aware of any case
in which a plaintiff was allowed to sue a defendant and still remain
anonymous to that defendant .... Although it is within the discretion of
the district court to grant [anonymity], the court has "a judicial duty to
inquire into the circumstances of particular cases to determine whether
the dispensation [of anonymity] is warranted" .... Nor are we aware of
any case in which an amicus ... has been permitted to remain anony-
mous .... The judge did not fulfill his duty to consider the impact of
anonymity on the public interest in knowing the identities of the partici-
pants in this proceeding.
133 49 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
134 Id. at 280-81.
135 Id. at 28 1.136 FED. R. Ctv. P. 10(a); see supra note 91.
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ness of courts. 137 Such summary dismissals are rare; however, the
decision in Roe v. New York is noteworthy because it underscores




A far greater number of courts have based their decision to al-
low or deny party anonymity on a balancing test. Courts adopting
a balancing test have attempted to balance the rights and interests
of the plaintiff against the rights and interests of the public. For
instance, in Doe v. Stegall, the court allowed the plaintiffs to main-
tain their anonymity while "advanc[ing] no hard and fast formula
for ascertaining whether a party may sue anonymously," and stat-
ing that "[t]he decision requires a balancing of considerations call-
ing for maintenance of a party's privacy against the customary and
constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial
proceedings."'
139
Courts often invoke the balancing test, and a balancing test
has been suggested by commentators, 14 but, as discussed below, I
believe that the proposed test for anonymity offers a better solu-
tion, without sacrificing the concerns addressed in the this test.
3. Content-Based Test
In Doe v. Deschamps,'4' a pregnant woman challenged the
constitutionality of Montana laws regulating abortions. The court
allowed the woman to maintain her anonymity based on the fact
that the suit involved the "intensely personal nature of preg-
nancy": 142
[I]t is clear that a practice has developed permitting individu-
als to sue under fictitious names where the issues involved
are matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature. Charac-
teristic of these are the birth control cases, the abortion cases,
the welfare cases involving illegitimate children or children
137 Roe, 49 F.R.D. at 281; see also Doe v. United States DOJ, 93 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D. Colo.
1982) (holding that "action has not been commenced and it will not be commenced unless and
until it is filed in full compliance with Rule 10(a)"); Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (dismissing the case sua sponte).
138 See generally Rice, supra note 92, at 913-19 (discussing failure of current federal pro-
cedure to adequately address anonymous parties).
139 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981).
140 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 92, at 36.
141 64 F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 1974).
142 Id. at 653.
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whose fathers have abandoned them, and at least one case in-
volving homosexuality. 1
43
While this type of content-based test offers a clean simplicity,
it is the least satisfying test; as Professor Steinman noted, "courts
must not decide automatically the pseudonymity issue based on
whether a case falls into a familiar fact pattern. ' 44  Much like a
blanket prohibition, content-based tests fail to consider fully a liti-
gant's right of anonymity or the inherent openness of courts.
145
Nevertheless, courts have frequently based their decisions us-
ing a content-based test, despite occasional statements to the con-
trary. For instance, in the recent case of Roe v. Aware Woman
Center for Choice, Inc.,146 the majority disingenuously stated that
the "'ultimate test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anony-
mously is whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right
which outweighs the ... presumption of openness in judicial pro-
ceedings."" 147 The majority was properly criticized by the dissent
for "establish[ing] a per se rule entitling any plaintiff in any case
involving her abortion to proceed anonymously."'
148
The use of a rigid content-based test establishes per se rules
of law that allow a litigant to automatically overcome the inherent
openness of courts. As with carte-blanche anonymous juries, 149
such per se rules should not be used. Per se rules fail to consider
the constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial
proceedings, and they also fail to consider a litigant's right to ano-
nymity. For instance, a per se rule was used by the Fifth Circuit in
Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law Stu-
143 Id. (footnotes omitted).
t4 Steinman, supra note 92, at 83.
145 See William S. Kleinman, Note, Who Is Suing You?: John Doe Plaintiffs in the Federal
Courts, 61 TEx. L. REV. 547, 549 (1982) (contending that the use of a category-based rule "un-
duly limits Doe-plaintiff suits to those involving fact patterns previously recognized as amena-
ble to the practice .... [and that such a] rule does not look beyond the prohibition-exception
approach ... [and simply] tolls the ad hoc development of the practice, apparently assuming
that all acceptable exceptions have been recognized previously, and that all recognized excep-
tions are acceptable").
1- 253 F.3d 678 (1 1th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071 (2001).
147 Id. at 685 (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11 th Cir. 1992)).
148 Id. at 691 (Hill, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part):
As the majority explained: "[T]he district court did not cite, and the de-
fendants have been unable to provide us with, a single published deci-
sion from any jurisdiction denying a plaintiff's request to proceeding
anonymously in a case involving abortion. By contrast, a number of de-
cisions have pointed to abortion as the paradigmatic example of the type
of highly sensitive and personal matter that warrants a grant of anonym-
ity."
Id. at 685 (footnote omitted).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 48-74.
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dents v. Wynne & Jaffe'50 to deny anonymity to plaintiffs who at-
tempted to sue two Dallas law firms. The plaintiffs, a women law
students association and four female lawyers, alleged that the firms
engaged in illegal sexual discrimination in the hiring of summer
and regular associates.' 5' The court's content-based test failed to
consider fully the plaintiff's interests - namely, the threat of re-
taliation' 52 - and led to a denial of anonymity: "Plaintiff have not
cited, nor have we found, any prior decisions which recognized or
even discuss the right of Title VII plaintiffs to proceed anony-
mously."'
' 53
Content-based tests appeared to be in disfavor, but the Elev-
enth Circuit's recent use of one in Aware Women Center may sig-
nal its return.
4. Factor-Based Test
The fourth common test used by courts is the factor-based
test. Under this test, a plaintiff can maintain her anonymity if one
or more factors are met. In Doe v. Rostker, 54 three unnamed
plaintiffs alleged that the Selective Service registration procedures,
with which they fully complied, violated their rights under the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974.155 The court refused to grant the plaintiffs ano-
nymity, stating that: "[a] plaintiff should be permitted to proceed
anonymously in cases where [1] a substantial privacy interest is
involved," for example, where matters are highly sensitive or there
is a real danger of physical harm; or "[2] where the injury litigated
against would occur as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's
identity."'' 56 The court denied anonymity since the plaintiffs' only
150 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979).
151 Id. at 708-09.
52 See id. at 713 ("Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of A-D's identities will leave them vul-
nerable to retaliation from their current employers, prospective future employers and an organ-
ized bar that does 'not like lawyers who sue lawyers."').
153 Id. at 712. There are, of course, some content-based tests that are created by statute.
Typical of such, are statutes designed to protect juveniles. Contra Candace Zierdt, The Little
Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right
Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401,420-21 (1999) (discussing recent state and federal reforms elimi-
nating and/or reducing juvenile anonymity). An interesting twist on anonymity created by stat-
ute is seen in Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973), where a group of
migrant farm workers, proceeding in forma pauperis, were allowed to proceed anonymously.
Since, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Secretary of Labor had authority to
bring suits on behalf of unnamed persons to protect them from reprisal, the court granted ano-
nymity and gave the plaintiffs "the same safeguards that [they would have had] had the Secre-
tary of Labor brought the action. Id. at 107.
154 89 F.R.D. 158 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
155 Id. at 159-60; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
156 Rostker, 89 F.R.D. at 162; see also James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993)
(discussing how trial courts should consider judicially recognized factors when exercising dis-
cretion to grant or deny anonymity). Such factors include whether the justification asserted by
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privacy interest at risk was disclosure of their names. The court
reasoned that if plaintiffs were successful on the merits their only
connection with the draft would be as victors in their lawsuit, and
if plaintiffs were unsuccessful, then the issue would be moot.'57
C. Proposed Test for Anonymous Parties
Although the use of a factor-based test is the best approach to
anonymity, courts lack a consistent test and, as a result, ask incon-
sistent questions and look at various different factors when utiliz-
ing a factor-based test.' 58 The proposed test offers a simple and
straightforward test that is consistent with the Court's anonymous
speech cases and the constitutionally embedded presumption of
openness in judicial proceedings. Moreover, the proposed text al-
lows party anonymity to be consistent with juror anonymity.
When considering party anonymity, a court should grant anonym-
ity only when (1) anonymity affects the content of the litigation; or
(2) the lack of anonymity significantly burdens a litigant's ability
to file suit.
D. Applying the Proposed Test for Anonymous Parties
When applying the test in a civil context - as is often the case
with party anonymity - a fair amount of deference should be given
to the potential anonymous party, and to the reasons offered for
anonymity. Such deference may make anonymity in civil proceed-
ings more readily available, but such an outcome would be consis-
tent with the Court's anonymous speech doctrine and with the dif-
ference between the interests that are at stake in civil and criminal
trials.
Although the First Amendment guarantees that both criminal
and civil trials remain open to the public, 59 the presumption of
openness in judicial proceedings "operates only as a presumption
and not as an absolute, unreviewable license to deny [closure]."' 6°
Such flexibility is designed to recognize that a fair trial is more
important than an open trial: "[T]he atmosphere essential to the
preservation of a fair trial - the most fundamental of all freedoms
the requesting party "is to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature;
[and] whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm." Id.
157 Rostker, 89 F.R.D. at 162.
158 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
159 Cf. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) ("Whether
the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we
note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.").
160 James, 6 F.3d at 238.
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- must be maintained at all costs."'1 61 Anonymity should be more
readily available in civil trials, because, unlike a fair criminal trial,
a fair civil trial is not constitutionally defined as a "public trial,"1 62
and because the anonymous speech doctrine stands for the proposi-
tion that an individual should not be impermissibly discouraged
from exercising her rights - most importantly, the right to partici-
pate in the political process, which includes the use of the courts,
and also the right to redress wrongs.163
This is not to say that anonymity should be granted in all civil
trials. Instead, the proposed rule should simply be applied against
the backdrop of the anonymous speech doctrine and in recognition
of the differences between civil and criminal trials.' 64
Such deference is most appropriate in suits against the gov-
ernment because in such situations the political process values that
are embodied in the anonymous speech doctrine are at their great-
est: "The freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the lit-
erary realm . . . . Writing for the Court, Justice Black noted that
'[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout his-
tory have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws ei-
ther anonymously or not at all."",165 Although the issue in McIntyre
(and ACLF) was core political speech, the Court has consistently
recognized a right of anonymity that extends beyond political
speech. For instance, in Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart, 66 a
case dealing with a protective order prohibiting newspapers from
publishing information obtained during pretrial discovery, the
Court explicitly rejected the notion that a protective order may re-
strict the inherent openness of a trial only if the order's proponent
shows a compelling governmental interest. 67 Instead of looking
for a compelling governmental interest to sustain the protective
order, the Court looked at the moving party's interest:
161 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
162 U.S. CONST. amend VI.
163 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct.
2080, 2090 (2002) (discussing how conditions on anonymous speech should not force patriotic
citizens to choose silence over speech).
164 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 538-39 ("The purpose of the requirement of a public trial was to
guarantee that the accused would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. History had
proven that secret tribunals were effective instruments of oppression."). Moreover, a fair civil
trial is fundamentally different, in both form and procedure, from a fair criminal trial. Cf. supra
note 86.
165 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (quoting Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)) (alteration in original).
166 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
167 Id. at 30-31.
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The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the
importance of ensuring that potential litigants have unim-
peded access to the courts: "As the trial court rightly ob-
served, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity,
individuals may well forgo the pursuit of their just claims.
The judicial system will thus have made the utilization of its
remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or un-
willing to use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable
as that of speech itself."'
Anonymity is an appropriate means to avoid this chilling ef-
fect, since it can be used to prevent undue "annoyance, embar-
rassment, and even oppression."
'169
The need to prevent undue annoyance, embarrassment, and
oppression is even greater today than when either Rhinehart or
McIntyre were decided. Technological changes have made infor-
mation much more readily available today, and, as a result, parties,
whose names appear in cases and whose names are thus widely
disseminated (unlike the names of jurors) are more likely to forgo
the pursuit of just claims rather than expose themselves to un-
wanted publicity:
Court proceedings and the records thereof long have been
open to the public. It is critical to recognize, however, that
the information age has had a profound effect on the avail-
ability of the information they contain. Not long ago, the
practical reality was that one could learn of the existence of a
lawsuit involving a particular individual only by the most
time-consuming searches of records located in courthouses
all over the country. Unless one knew what to look for and
almost exactly where to look for it, the "openness" of the in-
168 Id. at 36 n.22 (emphasis added) (quoting Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673,
689 (Wash. 1982), affd, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)); see also Village of Stratton, 122 S.Ct. at 2090.
169 Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (quoting Rhinehart v. Seattle
Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 690 (Wash. 1982); see also Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice,
253 F.3d 678, 690 (11 th Cir. 2001) (Hill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (distinguish-
ing the right to proceed anonymously in cases involving a suit against a private party from suits
challenging governmental activity). Although the concern in Rhinehart was access to the
courts, see Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 37 n.24 ("Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort to the courts for redress of griev-
ances would have been 'chilled."'), the Court has recognized a general right to be free from
undue annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression: "The right to privacy in one's political asso-
ciations and beliefs will yield only to a 'subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,
and then only if there is a 'substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overrid-
ing and compelling state interest."' Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459
U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (discussing impermissible abridgment of personal rights through
governmental action, regardless of whether oppression is intended).
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formation was more theoretical than real. But the computer
has changed all that. It now is possible to determine whether
a given individual is a party to a lawsuit in federal court
anywhere in the country by the simplest of computer searches
.... In consequence, the privacy that litigants once enjoyed
as a practical matter has been diminished greatly already and
will be eroded still further in the near future. These devel-
opments pose important issues as the courts seek to reconcile
two legitimate and, to some extent, competing values: indi-
vidual privacy and public access to the judicial system.17°
The information age, in and of itself, is not sufficient to auto-
matically overcome the constitutionally embedded presumption of
openness in judicial proceedings; technology certainly makes us
more aware of the competing values, but it does not create a whole
new paradigm, as the openness of courts is still axiomatic.
However, the impact of these changes has not been properly
realized by courts. For instance in Femedeer v. Haun,1 71 the Tenth
Circuit denied anonymity to a convicted sex offender who was
challenging Utah's sex offender registration and notification stat-
ute. 72 In its denial of anonymity, the court incorrectly stated that
the posting of the plaintiff's "identity and other personal informa-
tion on the Internet is likely to be more extensive than is the expo-
sure resulting from his name on the caption of this lawsuit."'' 73 In
reality, the plaintiff's exposure from having his name on the cap-
tion of the lawsuit was at least eleven times greater than the expo-
sure from having his identity and other personal information
posted on the Internet.1
74
Some may argue that changes in technology are irrelevant to
whether a party should be granted anonymity; opponents of ano-
170 Doe v. New York, 201 F.R.D. 100, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying anonymity); see also
Jennifer B. Lee, Dirty Laundry, Online for All to See, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at GI (discuss-
ing the "practical obscurity" of court documents prior to the "e-government" movement and
how Hamilton County, Ohio, has been facing unforeseen issues and complaints since it decided
to put court documents online).
171 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000). Jon Femedeer is a pseudonym.
172 Id. at 1246-47.
173 Id. at 1246.
174 The results of a Google web search yielded forty-five unique results for "femedeer v
haun," and four unique results, including two results involving a Utah court case, for a name
randomly chosen from the Utah Sex Offender Registry (Timothy Arcaris). Search of Google
web database, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=femedeer+v+haun (last visited Feb. 1,
2003); search of Google web database, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=%22 Timo-
thy+Arcaris%22 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003); The Official State of Utah Sex Offender Registry,
available at http://www.cr.ex.state.ut.us/asp-bin/sexoffendersearchform.asp (last visited Feb. 1,
2003). Since I was unable to determine the name of the plaintiff in Femedeer, I obtained a
random name from Utah Sex Offender Registry by entering the zip code for Moab, 84532, and
selecting the first name that appeared on the list.
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nymity can point to the simple fact that "[t]he people have a right
to know who is using their courts,"'175 and to the notion that
"[w]hat transpires in the courtroom is public property."' 76 While
this is true - the public has a First Amendment right to attend trials
and a right to monitor the functions of government 77 - there is a
difference between preventing the public or press from attending a
trial, and preventing the public from learning the true name of a
litigant:
The equation linking the public's right to attend trials and the
public's right to know the identity of the parties is not per-
fectly symmetrical. The public right to scrutinize govern-
mental functioning is not so completely impaired by a grant
of anonymity to a party as it is by closure of the trial itself.
Party anonymity does not obstruct the public's view of the is-
sues joined or the court's performance in resolving them.
The assurance of fairness preserved by public presence at a
trial is not lost when one party's cause is pursued under a fic-
titious name. These crucial interests served by open trials are
not inevitably compromised by allowing a party to proceed
anonymously. 178
There is an important distinction between anonymous parties
and anonymous juries: when an anonymous jury is empanelled, the
public and press are unable to scrutinize the judicial process. A
consideration of the propriety of anonymous parties requires a fo-
cus on the very narrow issue of the public's right to know the iden-
tity of the parties - as opposed to a focus on the broad issue of the
public's right to attend trials. Such a focus is especially appropri-
ate when a party is suing the government, since opponents of party
anonymity will often focus on a defendant's right to be equally
free from undue harassment or publicity 179 - an argument that has
75 Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997).
176 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
177 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980).
'78 Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (citations omitted); see
also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring)
("It follows that the conduct of the trial is preeminently a matter of public interest.") (emphasis
added). But see Doe v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467 (E.D. Pa.
1997) ("The public's right to know the true identity of the parties is concomitant with the right
of public access to judicial proceedings and records."); Doe v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm.,
818 A.2d 14, 33-34 (Conn. 2003) ("[Tjhe question of who is using the judicial system is
ordinarily as much a part of [the inherent openness of judicial proceedings] as why it is being
used.")
179 See, e.g., Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 690 (1 lth Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071 (2001), (Hill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("[Tihere is a very good reason for not allowing Roe to proceed anonymously. Roe has sued
private parties who were engaged in lawful activity, accusing them of serious violations of
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no weight when a party initiates a suit against the government in
order to test validity of a law or statute. As the Fifth Circuit noted,
there is "no injury to the Government's 'reputation"' in cases
"challenging the constitutional, statutory or regulatory validity of
government activity.
18°
Finally, although there has been an increase in the use of ficti-
tious names, there is little reason to fear their widespread use, even
in suits against the government. There are two reasons for this: (1)
anonymity comes with some baggage; and (2) litigants, especially
those challenging governmental action, often publicize their cause.
The attendant baggage that comes with anonymity is an im-
portant consideration when applying the proposed test, and when
asking whether the need for anonymity is directly related to the
content of the suit or the litigant's ability to bring a suit - specifi-
cally, the question is whether the request for anonymity is based
on a party's need to avoid undue annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression, or if it is for less noble purposes.181 This distinction
was recognized by the Fourth Circuit in James v. Jacobson.I8 2 The
case dealt with Mary and John James' suit to collect damages
against their physician after he artificially inseminated Mrs. James
with his own sperm, rather than that of Mr. James. 83 The Jameses
sought anonymity in order to prevent harming their pre-adolescent
children, at that point in time in their lives, with the revelation that
federal law. These individuals, whose identities are fully exposed in her lawsuit, have had their
professional reputations impugned by the mere filing of her lawsuit."); Doe v. New York, 201
F.R.D. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Although plaintiff's reputation concern is understandable, if
exaggerated, it certainly is not even-handed .... The [defendants] have no lesser interests in
their reputations than plaintiff, yet she has shown no solicitude for their privacy, and they were
not afforded an opportunity to seek to have their names withheld from the public."); Free Mar-
ket Compensation v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (reasoning
that when a plaintiff publicly accuses a defendant of serious violations of federal law, basic
fairness dictates she do so under her real name).
180 S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707,
713 (5th Cir. 1979). But see Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[B]ecause the
plaintiffs were suing private individuals rather than a government agency, the court found more
reason not to grant the plaintiffs' request for anonymity. Wynee & Jaffe does not stand, how-
ever, for the proposition that there is more reason to grant a plaintiff's request for anonymity if
the plaintiff is suing the government."); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 189 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.
1981) (Gee, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne who strikes the king should do so unmasked or not at all.").
See generally Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (holding
that any restriction on political speech is subject to strict scrutiny); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that the decision of an author of a political leaflet to
remain anonymous "is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.").
181 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348 n.l 1 ("People are intelligent enough to evaluate the
source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. They know it is anonymous.
They can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they are permitted, as they
must be, to read that message.").
182 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993).
113 Id. at 235.
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their conception was by artificial insemination and that John James
was not, as they had supposed, their biological father.' 84 The ap-
pellate court reversed the district court's denial of anonymity,
drawing a distinction between when anonymity is requested
''merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any
litigation" and when anonymity is requested "to preserve privacy
in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature."'
' 85
Finally, widespread anonymity is unlikely to occur - espe-
cially in suits against the government - since litigants often publi-
cize their causes. Organizations often use publicity to champion
their causes and to generate good will. Notable examples include:
the American Civil Liberties Union; 86 the American Center for
Law and Justice; 187 and even the Jehovah's Witnesses. 8 8 There-
fore, it is the rare party who seeks anonymity, and often only to
avoid undue annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression.
CONCLUSION
Openness is one of the defining characteristics of American
judicial proceedings; thus, as a general matter, anonymity directly
conflicts with the constitutionally embedded presumption of open-
ness in judicial proceedings and is disfavored. In criminal and
civil trials, anonymity deprives the public of its rights to monitor
the functions of government, to know what transpires in the court-
room, and to know who is using its courts. In criminal trials ano-
nymity also deprives a defendant of the Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial by an impartial jury and to a presumption of inno-
cence.
Nevertheless, anonymity and individual privacy play impor-
tant roles in our system of justice. Anonymity may be perceived
as a threat to the constitutionally embedded presumption of open-
ness in judicial proceedings, but, in some situations, the denial of
anonymity poses a greater threat to effective justice than anonym-
ity itself - a fact that the Supreme Court has consistently recog-
184 Id. at 241.
185 Id. at 238.
186 See ACLU, American Civil Liberties Union: In The Courts, at http://www.aclu.org/
court/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (discussing ACLU's role and interest in the current
Supreme Court term, and, via hyperlink, previous Supreme Court terms).
187 See JAY SEKULOW, THE Am. CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, CASES INDEX, at
http://www.aclj.org/cases-index.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (discussing the ACU's role in
cases from the United States Supreme Court to local school boards).
188 See WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, JEHOVAS WITNESSES -
WHO ARE THEY? WHAT DO THEY BELIEVE?, at http://www.watchtower.org/library/jt/ arti-
cle_02.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (discussing their service to civil liberties and their "win-
ning 43 cases before the Supreme Court of the United States").
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nized. Despite its importance, anonymity is often misconstrued,
and thus it is in need of proper understanding and formal recogni-
tion.
This Note's proposed test for anonymity is an attempt to bal-
ance the competing interests at stake whenever a court is asked to
decide whether to empanel an anonymous jury or to allow a liti-
gant to proceed anonymously. The proposed test represents a
straightforward, flexible, and general approach to anonymity, and
provides for consistency between the use of an anonymous jury
and the use of party anonymity.
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